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COMMENTS 
TAXATION: DEDUCTION OF EXPENSES INCURRED BY 
ANOTHER IN THE PERFORMANCE OF A SERVICE 
TO A CHARITABLE ORGANIZATION 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Internal Revenue Code (the "Code") allows a taxpayer to de-
duct, as a charitable contribution, gifts to qualified organizations.! If a 
taxpayer provides a service to such an organization, the taxpayer may 
not deduct the value of the services.2 He may, however, deduct un-
reimbursed expenditures incurred as a result of providing such services. 3 
When taxpayers deduct payments for expenses resulting from services 
provided by someone other than the taxpayer, the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice (IRS) has consistently denied such deductions. Litigation of this 
issue has led to disparate results. In virtually identical situations, the 
United States Tax Court and the United States District Court for the 
District of Idaho denied the deductions,4 while the United States Courts 
1. I.R.C. § 170 (1982 & West Supp. 1988). Unless otherwise noted, all references 
herein are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986. Section 170 provides in part: 
(a) Allowance of deduction. -
(1) General rule.-There shall be allowed as a deduction any charita-
ble contribution (as defined in subsection (c» payment of which is made 
within the taxable year. A charitable contribution shall be allowable as a 
deduction only if verified under regulations prescribed by the Secretary. 
• • • • 
(c) Charitable contribution defined.-For purposes of this section, the 
term "charitable contribution" means a contribution or gift to or for the 
use of-
• • • • 
(2) A corporation, trust, or community chest, fund, or foundation-
• • • • 
(B) organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, 
literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur 
sports competition (but only if no part of its activities involve the provision of 
athletic facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to children or 
animals; 
(C) no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private 
shareholder or individual. . . . 
2. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-l(g) (as amended in 1984). 
3. Id. Section 1.170A-l(g) provides: 
[U]nreimbursed expenditures made incident to the rendition of services to 
an organization contributions to which are deductible may constitute a 
deductible contribution. For example, the cost of a uniform without gen-
eral utility which is required to be worn in performing donated services is 
deductible. Similarly. out-of-pocket transportation expenses necessarily 
incurred in performing donated services are deductible. Reasonable ex-
penditures for meals and lodging necessarily incurred while away from 
home in the course of performing donated services also are deductible. 
4. See Brinley v. Commissioner, 82 T.e. 932 (1984), aff'g 46 T.C.M. (CCH) 734 
(1983), vacated, 782 F.2d 1326 (5th Cir. 1986); Davis v. United States, 664 F. Supp. 
468 (D. Idaho 1987). 
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of Appeals for the Fifth and Tenth Circuits permitted them. S This article 
examines the different approaches taken by the courts in these cases, the 
tests applied as a result of the different approaches and the origin of the 
different tests applied. Based on a recent Supreme Court decision6 in-
volving a charitable contribution of a different character, a new test is 
proposed, and pertinent factors to be considered in its application are 
discussed. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Statutory Provisions 
Section 170 of the Code allows a taxpayer to deduct contributions or 
gifts to or for the use of an organization operated exclusively for reli-
gious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes.7 Generally, 
no deductions are allowed for personal, living and family expenses,8 or 
for the value of services contributed to a charitable organization.9 Treas-
ury Regulation section 1.170A-l(g), however, does allow the deduction 
of unreimbursed expenditures made incident to the rendition of services 
to a charity.lO Reasonable expenditures for meals and lodging necessar-
ily incurred while away from home as well as out-of-pocket transporta-
tion costs necessarily incurred in the course of performing donated 
services are deductible. 1 1 
B. Court Decisions 
In Brinley v. Commissioner 12 (Brinley I), the Tax Court held that 
the taxpayers could not take as a charitable deduction payments made 
for the expenses of their son who had been called by his church to serve 
for a period of two years as a full-time, ordained and unsalaried mission-
ary.13 The payments at issue in Brinley I were made by the taxpayers to 
a church-designated travel agent for their son's travel to the site of mis-
sionary service. 14 Subsequent payments were made directly to their son 
to support hini while he served as a missionary.Is The parents claimed 
5. See Brinley v. Commissioner, 782 F.2d 1326 (5th Cir. 1986); White v. United States, 
725 F.2d 1269 (10th Cir. 1984). 
6. See United States v. American Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105 (1986). 
7. I.R.C. § 170(a)(I), (c)(2)(B) (1982). 
8. I.R.C. § 262 (1982). Section 262 provides, "[e]xcept as otherwise expressly pro-
vided in this chapter, no deduction shall be allowed for personal, living, or family 
expenses." [d. 
9. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-l(g) (as amended in 1984). 
10. [d. 
11. [d. 
12. 46 T.C.M. (CCH) 734 (1983), aff'd, 82 T.e. 932 (1984), vacated, 782 F.2d 1326 (5th 
Cir. 1986). 
13. [d. at 738. 
14. [d. at 737. 
15. [d. at 735, 737. 
526 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 17 
the payments as a charitable deduction on their income tax return. 16 The 
Commissioner of the IRS disallowed the deduction, and the Brinleys pe-
titioned the Tax Court. The Tax Court held that the payments by the 
taxpayers directly to the travel agency and to their son did not qualify for 
a charitable deduction for two reasons. First, neither the travel agency 
nor the son was a qualified recipient of charitable contributions under 
section 170. 17 Second, the Tax Court utilized a "contributions analysis," 
examining whether the payments constituted a contribution by the par-
ents to or for the use of the church}8 The court held that the payments 
did nof constitute a contribution to the church because the church main-
tained no control over the funds ("control test").19 
In White v. United States,20 a case factually indistinguishable from 
Brinley 1,21 the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held 
the payments to be deductible.22 The court analyzed the payments as 
unreimbursed expenditures incurred as a result of charitable service 
("unreimbursed expenditure analysis").23 Although the government 
urged the court to apply the Tax Court's control test, the Tenth Circuit 
found that application of the control test is inappropriate where expenses 
are incurred by a taxpayer performing services for a qualified organiza-
tion.24 The court, criticizing the Tax Court's reasoning in Brinley I, 
found no "rational basis for distinguishing the payment of the expenses 
of a dependent son from the payment of the taxpayer's own expenses to 
perform the same service."25 Applying the unreimbursed expenditure 
analysis, the Tenth Circuit found the proper focus to be whether the do-
nor's intent was charitable.26 Specifically, the court found the proper test 
to be "whether the primary purpose [of the taxpayer's donation] is to 
further the aims of the charitable organization or to benefit the person 
whose expenses are being paid. "27 The court determined that the trans-
portation and living expenses of a missionary serving far from home pri-
marily benefit the church and not the person making the payments 
("primary benefit test").28 The payments would be deductible by the son 
and, thus, were deductible by the parent.29 
16. [d. at 735. 
17. [d. at 737. 
18. [d. at 737-38. 
19. [d. 
20. 725 F.2d 1269 (10th Cir. 1984). 
21. See id. at 1270. 
22. [d. at 1272. 
23. [d. at 1271. 
24. [d. 
25. [d. The court found that Code section 262, which disallows deductions for per-
sonal, living or family expenses, does not support such a distinction. [d.; I.R.C. 
§ 262 (1982). 
26. White, 725 F.2d at 1272. 
27. [d. 
28. [d. 
29. [d. at 1271-72. 
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Subsequent to the Tenth Circuit decision in White, the Brinleys peti-
tioned the Tax Court for reconsideration of its decision in Brinley I. Af-
ter reconsideration of the issue, the Tax Court, in Brinley v. 
CommissionerJO (Brinley II) reaffirmed its original decision.31 The Tax 
Court found that the facts in White and Brinley did not support an un-
reimbursed expenses analysis and, therefore, took exception to the Tenth 
Circuit's application of a primary benefit test. 32 The Tax Court reasoned 
that "the plain meaning of the language used in section 1.170A -I (g) of 
the Income Tax Regulations, does not allow a taxpayer to deduct un-
reimbursed expenses incident to another family member's service to a 
charity."33 The court stated that only the taxpayer who renders the ser-
vice to the charity is allowed a charitable deduction for unreimbursed 
expenses resulting from those services. 34 Thus, although the son might 
be able to deduct his expenses, the parent cannot. 
Applying the contributions analysis, the Tax Court held that the 
taxpayer must intend that the payment benefit the church,3s and the tax-
payer must demonstrate this intent by placing the funds under the con-
trol of the charity. 36 Because the church maintained no control over the 
funds, the control test was not satisfied and the Tax Court disallowed the 
deduction.37 
The Brinleys appealed the Tax Court's decision to the Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit (Brinley III).38 The Fifth Circuit addressed 
the issue by utilizing both the unreimbursed expenditure analysis of the 
Tenth Circuit and the contributions analysis of the Tax Court.39 Con-
trary to the finding of the Tax Court, the Fifth Circuit found nothing on 
the face of section 1.170A-I(g) expressly limiting the deduction for ex-
penditures incurred in the rendition of charitable service to the person 
who actually performs the service.40 For the payment of these expenses 
to qualify as a deduction, the court held that the charitable work must be 
the cause of the payment.41 The court further held that the "charitable 
work is the cause of an expenditure if the charity is the primary benefici-
30. Brinley v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 932 (1984), aff'g 46 T.C.M. (CCH) 734 (1983), 
vacated, 782 F.2d 1326 (5th Cir. 1986). 
31. Id. Under Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742 (1970), aff'd, 445 F.2d 985 (10th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971), the Tax Court is bound only by prior deci-
sions of the court of appeals to which a case would be appealed. Id. at 756-57. The 
Brinleys' appeal was to the Fifth Circuit and, therefore, the Tax Court was not 
bound by the Tenth Circuit decision in White. Brinley II, 82 T.C. at 936. 
32. Brinley II, 82 T.C. at 937-38. 
33.Id. 
34. Id. at 938-39. 
35. Id. at 941. 
36. Id. at 940-41. 
37. Id. at 941. 
38. See Brinley V. Commissioner, 782 F.2d 1326 (5th Cir. 1986). 
39. See id. at 1332, 1334. 
40. Id. at 1332. 
41. Id. at 1331. 
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ary."42 The court stated that application of the control test to prove the 
donor's intent to benefit the charity was not required because the court 
considered charitable intent to be irrelevant.43 
Under the unreimbursed expenditure analysis, expenditures for 
proselytizing materials and out-of-pocket transportation expenses in-
curred in performing missionary work would be for the benefit of the 
church and would, therefore, be deductible.44 Because the son would be 
spending an extended period of time in the place where he was perform-
ing missionary services, however, the court determined that the son was 
not "away from home" within the meaning of section 1. 170A -1 (g). 4S 
Therefore, under the unreimbursed expenditure analysis, the personal ex-
penditures for the recreation, meals and lodging of the son would be pri-
marily for the benefit of the individual missionary and, thus, would not 
be deductible.46 
On the other hand, under the contributions analysis, the Fifth Cir-
cuit found that even if the payments primarily benefited the individual 
missionary, the taxpayer would still be entitled to deduct the payments if 
the church had control over the funds. 47 Discretion by the church as to 
the use of the funds would constitute adequate contro1.48 
Donations that carry restrictions that they be used for the benefit of 
some specified private individual are not deductible because the church 
would have no discretion as to the use of the funds. 49 The court deter-
mined, however, that· control over the funds does not require actual or 
physical possession of the donation by either the charitable organization 
or an officer or agent of the organization. so Control is established when a 
donation is made in response to the charity's solicitation for funds to 
support a specific charitable purpose. 5 1 The court found that control 
would be establisheds2 if the taxpayer can demonstrate a matching be-
42.Id. 
43. Id. at 1332. 
44.Id. 
45. Id. at 1333-34. Section 1.170A-1(g) provides in part: "For the purposes of this 
paragraph, the phrase 'while away from home' has the same meaning as that phrase 
is used for purposes of section 162 and the regulations thereunder." Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.170A-1(g) (as amended in 1984). 
46. Brinley III, 782 F.2d at 1332, 1334. Addressing the government's concern that a 
liberal construction of the regulations would result in deductions for the same ex-
pense by both the person making the payment and the person performing the ser-
vice, and a shifting of deductions from individuals in low-income tax brackets to 
those in high-income tax brackets, the court responded by stating that such abuse 
could be precluded by rigorous application of the primary benefit test. This test 
requires that for the payment to be deductible under section 170, the taxpayer bears 
the burden of proving that each payment to a third party primarily benefitted the 
charitable organization. Id. at 1332. 
47. Id. at 1334. 
48.Id. 
49.Id. 
50. Id. at 1335. 
51. Id. 
52.Id. 
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tween the charity's request that specific payments be made and the tax-
payer's expenditures. Therefore, the Fifth Circuit would allow the 
taxpayer to deduct payment for his son's meals and lodging if the tax-
payer could demonstrate such a matching. 53 Accordingly, the Fifth Cir-
cuit held that the taxpayer's payments constitute a charitable deduction 
if either the control test or the primary benefit test or a combination of 
both tests is satisfied. 54 
Subsequent to the Fifth Circuit's decision in Brinley III, the United 
States District Court for the District of Idaho decided a similar case. In 
Davis v. United States,55 the district court rejected both the Fifth and 
Tenth Circuit decisions and followed the holding of the Tax Court. 56 
The Davis court held that the primary benefit test is appropriate only 
where the taxpayer seeks a charitable deduction for his own expenses and 
therefore, unreimbursed expenses may be deducted only by the individ-
ual performing services away from home. 57 
Thus, the Tax Court and the Davis court require that the control 
test be satisfied under the contribution analysis. The Tenth Circuit re-
jects the control test of the contribution analysis and requires the pri-
mary benefit test to be satisfied under the unreimbursed expenditure 
analysis. Finally, the Fifth Circuit examines"both approaches and allows 
the deduction if either the control test or the primary benefit test or a 
combination of the tests is satisfied. Therefore, the question remains as 
to the appropriate test to be applied. 
III. ANALYSIS OF THE CASES 
The different tests applied and the different approaches taken by the 
individual courts in Brinley I, Brinley III, Davis and White are the result 
of those courts' differing resolutions of the following issues: (I) Whether 
Treasury Regulation section 1.170A-I(g) permits a taxpayer other than 
the person actually performing the service to claim a deduction, and 
(2) whether a taxpayer must intend the payments to benefit the church.58 
53. Id. at 1334-35. 
54. Id. at 1336. 
55. 664 F. Supp. 468 (D. Idaho 1987). The United States District Court for the District 
of Idaho lies in the Ninth Circuit. 
56. Id. at 472-73. 
57. Id. at 472. 
58. Another distinction between the Tenth Circuit holding in White and the Fifth Cir-
cuit holding in Brinley III is whether the sons were "away from home" within the 
meaning of Treasury Regulation section 1.l70A-l(g). Without discussing the appli-
cable law, the Tenth Circuit summarily stated, "[T]ransportation and living ex-
penses of a fulltime missionary serving far from home are deductible because ... 
the expenditures primarily benefit the church and not the spender." White v. 
United States, 725 F.2d at 1269, 1271 (lOth Cir. 1986). The Fifth Circuit applied 
the appropriate statutory and case law to determine that the son's "tax home" for 
purposes of section 170 was the site of his mission, and therefore the expenses were 
not incurred while the son was "away from home." Brinley v. Commissioner, 782 
F.2d 1326, 1333-34 (5th Cir. 1986). 
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A. Does Treasury Regulation Section 1. 1 70A-l (g) permit a taxpayer 
other than the person actually performing the service to claim 
a deduction? 
The first difference between the Tax Court and the Davis court deci-
sions and those of the Fifth and Tenth Circuits, is the latters' determina-
tions that Treasury Regulation section 1. 170A-l(g) allows someone other 
than the person providing the service to claim the deduction. The Tax 
Court in Brinley I & II and the Davis court held that only the person 
providing the service may claim such a deduction. 59 The Tenth Circuit 
in White found the regulation to be broad enough to allow a parent to 
deduct the expenses of a dependent child,60 while the Fifth Circuit in 
Brinley III found it broad enough to permit a taxpayer to deduct the 
expenses of any other person performing the service.61 The language of 
the regulation neither expressly limits such a deduction to the person 
providing the services nor expressly permits such a deduction by a person 
other than the provider of the services. 62 
Courts have permitted a taxpayer providing a service to a qualified 
organization to deduct expenses of other persons who are also providing 
a related service to the organization.63 In Smith v. Commissioner,64 the 
taxpayer, accompanied by his family, frequently traveled to Newfound-
land for the purpose of disseminating the teachings of his church to small 
groups of persons in the area.65 The Tax Court permitted a deduction 
for the taxpayer's travel, food and lodging expenses, as well as for similar 
expenses attributable to his wife and older children.66 The taxpayer's 
wife usually cooked for the group of religious followers and took care of 
the children, while the older children helped in the evangelistic work by 
distributing literature.67 The younger children did not contribute their 
services to the charitable activities; therefore, a deduction for the ex-
penses attributable to them was not allowed. 68 
The result in Smith may be distinguished from that in Brinley II and 
Davis on the basis that the expenses of Smith's wife and older children 
were in fact Smith's expenses incurred in the performance of his service 
to the church. If that were the case, however, the expenses attributable 
to the younger children should also be deductible, because the expenses 
were also for food and lodging incurred by the father while he was per-
59. Brinley v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 932, 938-39 (1984), vacated, 782 F.2d 1326 (5th 
Cir. 1986); Davis v. United States, 664 F. Supp. 468, 473 (D. Idaho 1987). 
60. White, 725 F.2d at 1271. 
61. Brinley III, 782 F.2d at 1332. 
62. See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-l(g) (as amended in 1984); see also supra note 3. 
63. See McCollum v. Commissioner, 47 T.C.M. (PH) 1808 (1978); Smith v. Commis-
sioner, 60 T.C. 988 (1973). 
64. 60 T.C. 988 (1973). 
65. Id. at 990. 
66. Id. at 991, 995. 
67. Id. at 991. 
68. Id. at 995. 
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forming a service while away from home. The better distinction is that 
the wife and older children were themselves performing a service to the 
church. This distinction leads to an interpretation of Treasury Regula-
tion section 1. 170A -1 (g) that permits a taxpayer to deduct the expenses 
of another providing a service only if the taxpayer is also providing a 
service to the charity. The broad language of the regulation, however, 
does not support such a narrow interpretation. 69 
Congress sought to encourage contributions to charitable organiza-
tions by providing for the deduction of such contributions from taxable 
income.7o Permitting a taxpayer to deduct the expenses of another who 
provides the service to the charity furthers that legislative purpose. Fre-
quently, persons with time to contribute services to charitable organiza-
tions, such as teenagers and retirees, have limited incomes and may not 
be able to afford the additional expenses resulting from such charitable 
work. On the. other hand, others who could afford such expenses may 
not have the free time necessary to provide charitable services. Allowing 
a person, who wishes to contribute funds to a charity to pay the expenses 
of another person who volunteers his services to that charity encourages 
both the charitable work and the contribution. 
Furthermore, under the Tax Reform Act of 1986,71 Congress en-
acted Code section 170(k), which disallows any traveling expenses, in-
cluding meals and lodging, while away from home if there is a significant 
element of personal pleasure, recreation, or vacation in such travel. 72 Be-
cause section 170(k) was passed after the Fifth and Tenth Circuit deci-
sions,73 Congress appears to have acquiesced to those decisions by not 
restricting the deductions to only the provider of the services. 74 
69. See supra note 3. 
70. See Haak v. United States, 451 F. Supp. 1087, 1091 (W.D. Mich. 1978). 
71. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 142(d), 100 Stat. 2117, 2120. 
72. I.R.C. § 170(k) (West Supp. 1988). Section 170(k) provides: "No deduction shall 
be allowed under this section for traveling expenses (including amounts expended 
for meals and lodging) while away from home, whether paid directly or by reim-
bursement, unless there i~ no significant element of personal pleasure, recreation, or 
vacation in such travel." Id. 
73. The Tenth Circuit decided White in January, 1984. The Fifth Circuit decided Brin-
ley III in June, 1986. Congress passed the Tax Reform Act of 1986 in October, 
1986. 
74. The General Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, prepared by the staff of 
the Joint Committee on Taxation, states in part: 
[Section 170(k)] applies only with respect to expenses relating to travel by 
a taxpayer or by a person associated with the taxpayer (e.g., a family mem-
ber). The rule does not apply to the extent that the taxpayer pays for 
travel by third parties who are participants in the charitable activity. For 
example, this disallowance rule does not apply to travel expenditures per-
sonally incurred by a troop leader for a tax-exempt youth group who takes 
children (unrelated to the taxpayer) belonging to the group on a camping 
trip. . .. However, the disallowance rule applies in the case of any recipro-
cal arrangement (e.g., when two unrelated taxpayers pay each other's 
travel expenses, or members of a group contribute to a fund that pays for 
all of their travel expenses). 
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Note that in the situation where A pays the expenses resulting from 
B's service to a charitable organization, B may not take a deduction for 
the expenses (whether or not A claims the deduction). Because those 
expenses were paid by A, B has either been reimbursed for the expenses 
or never incurred the expenses. Therefore, as to B, the expenses are not 
"unreimbursed expenditures" within the meaning of Treasury Regula-
tion section 1. 170A -I (g)Js 
Where a taxpayer seeks to deduct the payment of expenses incurred 
by another person as a result of charitable service, the IRS should require 
the taxpayer to furnish certain information in his return to prevent 
abuses and duplicate deductions. Such information might include the 
social security number of the person providing the service and the rela-
tionship between that person and the taxpayer. Further, when the per-
son providing the service is a dependent of the taxpayer, the calculation 
of the amount of support required to classify that person as a dependent 
under Code section 15276 should not include the expenses claimed as a 
charitable deduction. 
B. Must a taxpayer intend the payments to benefit the church? 
The Tax Court holds that to receive a charitable deduction a tax-
payer must demonstrate that he intends a payment to benefit a charity. 
According to the Tax Court, a taxpayer demonstrates such intent by 
placing the funds under the control of the charity. 77 The Fifth Circuit, 
on the other hand, finds charitable intent to be irrelevant. 78 These diver-
gent conclusions are the result of the differing definitions that the respec-
tive courts assign to the term "gift" in section 170. 
Some courts require that a taxpayer intend a contribution to benefit 
the charity in order to be deductible under section 170.79 The courts 
have adopted the Supreme Court's definition in Commissioner v. Duber-
stein 80 of a "gift" that is excluded from gross income under section 102.81 
STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 99TH CONG., 2D SESS., GENERAL 
EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, 73 (Comm. Print 1987). 
75. See supra note 3. 
76. I.R.C. § 152 (1982). 
77. Brinley v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 932, 941 (1984), vacated, 782 F.2d 1326 (5th Cir. 
1986). 
78. Brinley v. Commissioner, 782 F.2d 1326, 1332 (5th Cir. 1986); see also Orr v. 
United States, 343 F.2d 553, 557 (5th Cir. 1965). 
79. See, e.g., White v. United States, 725 F.2d 1269, 1271-72 (10th Cir. 1984) (donor's 
intent must be charitable); Babilonia v. Commissioner, 681 F.2d 678, 679 (9th Cir. 
1982) (where a contribution benefits the donor as well as the charity, the primary 
purpose controls); Dowell v. United States, 553 F.2d 1233, 1238 (10th Cir. 1977) 
(critical issue revolves around donative intent); Tripp v. Commissioner, 337 F.2d 
432,436 (7th Cir. 1964) (where donor intends to aid a friend in securing an educa-
tion, payments to college are not deductible); Brinley v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 932, 
937 (1984) (the taxpayer must intend to contribute funds for the benefit of the 
charity). . 
80. 363 U.S. 278 (1960). 
81. [d. at 285. The issue in Duberstein was whether the taxpayer would be permitted to 
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Under this definition, a "contribution" or "gift" to or for the use of a 
charity is a payment of cash or property without adequate consideration 
and made from "detached and disinterested generosity."82 If the pay-
ment is the result of a moral or legal duty or is motivated by an antici-
pated economic benefit (other than its treatment as a tax deduction), it is 
not a gift. 83 In Duberstein, the Supreme Court found the transferor's 
donative intent to be the "most critical consideration. "84 
Other courts have rejected the Duberstein definition for purposes of 
charitable deductions, distinguishing the unfavored status of exclusions 
under section 102 from the favored treatment given charitable contribu-
tions under section 170.85 These courts refuse to find the SUbjective in-
tent of the donor to be determinative and allow a deduction to the extent 
the payment benefits the charity.86 When the taxpayer receives or ex-
pects to receive a substantial benefit, enough to provide a quid pro quo 
from the transaction, however, the deduction is not allowed.87 Thus, in 
Singer Co. v. United States,88 the United States Court of Claims held that 
discounts (bargain sales) given by the Singer Company to schools were 
not deductible because the Singer Company expected a return in the na-
ture of future increased sales when the students who had used the ma-
chines in the schools ultimately purchased machines of their own.89 
Discounts given by the company to other charities, however, were de-
ductible because no future sales could be expected as a result of the use of 
the machines by the other charities.9O 
A recent Supreme Court decision appears to have resolved the in-
tent requirement for charitable deductions under section 170. In United 
States v. American Bar Endowment,91 a case decided subsequent to Brin-
exclude from his taxable income the value of an automobile given to him by a busi-
ness associate. Id. at 280-81. Code section 102(a) states, "Gross income does not 
include the value of property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or inheritance." 
I.R.C. § 102(a) (1982). 
82. Duberstein, 363 U.S. at 285. 
83.Id. 
84. Id. at 285-86. 
85. See, e.g., Brinley v. Commissioner, 782 F.2d 1326, 1332 (5th Cir. 1986) (charitable 
intent is an irrelevant consideration); Crosby Valve & Gage Co. v. Commissioner, 
380 F.2d 146 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 976 (1967) (the court disagreed with 
the emphasis upon a purely charitable intent); Orr v. United States, 343 F.2d 553, 
557 (5th Cir. 1965) (the test is one of causation and the taxpayer's motivation is 
irrelevant); Singer Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 413,421 (Ct. Cl. 1971) (the court 
avoided resting its decision on the "disinterested generosity" rules). 
86. See Ottawa Silica Co. v. United States, 699 F.2d 1124, 1131-35 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (per 
curiam). 
87. Id. at 1132. "It is only when the donor receives or expects to receive additional 
substantial benefits that courts are likely to conclude that a quid pro quo for the 
transfer exists and that the donor is therefore not entitled to a charitable deduc-
tion." Id. 
88. 449 F.2d 413 (Ct. Cl. 1971). 
89. Id. at 424. 
90.Id. 
91. 477 U.S. 105 (1986). 
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ley III and White, the Supreme Court stated, "The sine qua non of a 
charitable contribution is a transfer of money or property without ade-
quate consideration. The taxpayer, therefore, must at a minimum 
demonstrate that he purposely contributed money or property in excess of 
the value of any benefit he received in return. "92 
The payments in American Bar Endowment had a dual character of 
purchase and contribution.93 The taxpayers purchased life insurance at 
group rates through American Bar Endowment (A.B.E.).94 As a precon-
dition to the purchase of the insurance, the taxpayers were required to 
relinquish their rights to any dividend at the end of the coverage pe-
riod.9s The relinquished dividends were retained by A.B.E. and used to 
support its charitable activity.96 Thus, the payments benefited both the 
taxpayer and the charity. If A.B.E. had returned the dividend to the 
taxpayers and the taxpayers had then contributed the amount of the divi-
dend to A.B.E., the contribution would have been deductible.97 The 
Supreme Court, however, determined that the dividends retained by 
A.B.E. were not deductible.98 
The Court adopted a two-part test established by the IRS for pay-
ments which have the dual character of contribution and purchase.99 If 
the taxpayer knowingly pays a higher price for the purchase intending 
the excess to benefit the charity, then the excess of the payment beyond 
any benefit received by the taxpayer is deductible. loo The first prong of 
the test provides that "the payment is deductible only if and to the extent 
it exceeds the market value of the benefit received."lol To satisfy the first 
prong, the taxpayer must show that he could have made a similar 
purchase at a lower price. 102 The second prong requires that "the excess 
payment must be 'made with the intention of making a gift.' "103 This is 
achieved where the taxpayer demonstrates that he possessed knowledge 
of the less expensive item at the time of the purchase but that he deliber-
ately made the more expensive purchase in order to benefit the charitable 
organization. 104 
The courts that do not require donative intent for charitable gifts 
distinguish between the favored status of charitable deductions under 
section 170 and the unfavored status of exclusions from income under 
92. Id. at 118 (emphasis supplied). 
93. Id. at 117-18. 
94. Id. at 108-09. 
95. Id. at 108. 
96.Id. 
97. Id. at 120 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
98. Id. at 118-19. 
99. Id. at 118. 
100. Id. at 117-18. 
101. Id. at 117. 
102.Id. 
103.Id. 
104. Id. at 117-18. 
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section 102. lOS No basis exists, however, for requiring intent for one type 
of charitable gift and not for another. Therefore, if charitable intent is 
required for gifts that are a combination of purchase and contribution 
under American Bar Endowment, such intent should be required for ex-
penses incurred in the performance of a service to a charitable organiza-
tion. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit's holding in Brinley III that the 
taxpayer's charitable intent is not relevant lO6 is inconsistent with the 
Supreme Court's requirement of such intent in the second prong of the 
American Bar Endowment test.107 To that extent, the Fifth Circuit's 
holding in Brinley III must be overruled. lOS 
To satisfy the intent requirement in American Bar Endowment, the 
taxpayers were required to show not only that they could have purchased 
less expensive coverage, but that they had actual knowledge of the less 
expensive insurance at the time they made their payments to A.B.E.IOO 
Therefore, where a taxpayer seeks to deduct payment of an expense in-
curred by another person in the performance of a service to a charitable 
organization, the taxpayer must show that he knew he was making a 
payment in excess of any benefit received by the performer of the service. 
In other words, the taxpayer must show not only that he knew that the 
service was being performed to benefit the charity, but also that he knew 
that expenses were incurred as a result of the service and made the pay-
ment to cover those expenses. 
105. See, e.g., Haak v. United States, 451 F. Supp. 1087, 1089-92 (W.D. Mich. 1978). 
106. Brinley v. Commissioner, 782 F.2d 1326, 1332 (5th Cir. 1986). 
107. See United States v. American Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105, 117 (1986). 
108. In Staples v. Commissioner, 821 F.2d 1324 (8th Cir. 1987), the Eight Circuit held 
that American Bar Endowment applies only when the taxpayer receives a recogniza-
ble tangible benefit. Id. at 1328. The issue in Staples was not whether a third party 
received a benefit from the payment, but whether the benefit received by the tax-
payer was a recognizable tangible benefit. The taxpayer in Staples received religious 
training in exchange for a payment to his church. Id. at 1325. The court held that 
the training did not constitute a recognizable tangible benefit and, therefore, Ameri-
can Bar Endowment did not control. Id. at 1328. The Eighth Circuit stated that 
the intent requirement of the second prong of the American Bar Endowment test 
was an element to be considered in valuating the benefit to the taxpayer. Id. Be-
cause the court determined that there was no recognizable tangible benefit to the 
taxpayer, the intent of the taxpayer was irrelevant. 
Significantly, three other circuits have decided that payments similar to those 
in Staples were not deductible because the taxpayers received a benefit equal to the 
amount of the payments. See Miller v. Commissioner, 829 F.2d 500 (4th Cir. 1987); 
Graham v. Commissioner, 822 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 
1994 (1988); Hernandez v. Commissioner, 819 F.2d 1212 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. 
granted, 108 S. Ct. 1467 (1988). Although the courts did not reach the issue of 
intent, the Fourth Circuit, in dicta, discussed the question of whether the "subjec-
tive intent or motive of the transferor, an objective assessme"nt of the difference in 
value of the transferred property and any return benefits to the transferor or some 
combination of the two" was required. Miller, 829 F.2d at 502 (finding that a resolu-
tion of this issue under the circumstances of the case was unnecessary). 
109. American Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. at 117-18. 
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C. Modified American Bar Endowment Test 
Development of the proper test to determine when a taxpayer may 
deduct his payment of expenses incurred by another who performs a ser-
vice for a charity begins with an examination of the different forms a gift 
may take. Substantiated gifts of cash given directly to a qualified organi-
zation are rarely questioned by the IRS. Frequently, however, gifts will 
be given either indirectly to an organization, such as through an agent of 
the charity, or in a form other than cash, such as bargain sales or per-
formance of a service. Many gifts provide a benefit not only to the char-
ity but to the taxpayer or a third party as well. Payments to a person 
who performs a service to a charitable organization are indirect and may 
provide a benefit to both the charity and the persoa. providing the service. 
The charitable organization receives the benefit of the service and the 
person performing the service may receive payment for some of his per-
sonal expenses. 
The payments in American Bar Endowment had the dual character 
of providing a benefit to both the charity and the taxpayer.ll0 The char-
ity received the dividend and the taxpayer received term life insurance 
for the year. Because the payments in Brinley, III White,112 and Davis 113 
provide a benefit to both the charity and the provider of services, they 
may be analogized to the payments in American Bar Endowment. There-
fore, the test adopted by the Supreme Court in American Bar Endow-
ment 114 may be modified to provide a test for determining whether a 
payment of an unreimbursed expense is deductible under section 170. 
In order for a donation having the dual character of contribution 
and purchase to constitute a deductible contribution under section 170, 
the Supreme Court requires: "First, the payment is deductible only if and 
to the extent it exceeds the market value of the benefit received [by the 
taxpayer]. Second, the excess payment must be 'made with the intention 
of making a gift.''' lIS In modifying this test for application to un-
reimbursed expenses made incident to the rendition of services to a chari-
table organization, it is necessary to apply each prong to the performance 
of the service (i.e., the provider of the service), as well as to the expense 
incurred in the performance of such service (i.e., the non-performing tax-
payer). The first prong of the American Bar Endowment test would re-
quire that payment of expenses be deductible only to the extent it exceeds 
any benefit received by either the performer of the service or the tax-
payer. The provider of the service would benefit to the extent of payment 
110. See id. at 116. 
111. See supra text accompanying notes 12-19 (Brinley I), 30-37 (Brinley II), 38-54 
(Brinley III). 
112. See supra text accompanying notes 20-29. 
113. See supra text accompanying notes 55-57. 
114. See supra text accompanying notes 99-104. 
115. United States v. American Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105, 117 (1986) (citation 
omitted). 
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for any expenses not incurred incident to the service, Le. expenses which 
would not be deductible by the provider of the service. The excess of any 
benefit received by the provider of service would be those expenses in-
curred as a result of the service. Therefore, the payment is deductible 
only to the extent that it would be deductible by the provider of service. 
The second prong of the American Bar Endowment test would require 
that both the taxpayer and the provider of service intend to benefit the 
charity. 
Thus, under a modified American Bar Endowment test a taxpayer 
would be required to establish four elements: (1) the service performed 
must provide a benefit to the charity in excess of any benefit to the tax-
payer seeking the deduction; 116 (2) the performance of the service is in-
tended to benefit the charity; 117 (3) the expense is incidental to the 
performance of the charitable service;1l8 and (4) the payment of the ex-
pense is made with the intention of making a gift to the charity.1l9 This 
modified American Bar Endowment test focuses both on the intent of the 
person providing the service and on the intent of the person making the 
payment and seeking the deduction. 
The benefit to the charity of the performance of the service and the 
charitable intent of the performer of the service is not an issue here and 
for the purposes of this discussion will be presumed to have been estab-
lished. Where a taxpayer seeks to deduct the expenses incurred by a 
third person performing charitable work, the third and fourth require-
ments become pivotal. 
D. Applicability of the Primary Benefit and Control Tests 
In determining whether an expense related to charitable service is 
incidental to the performance of the service, courts generally have found 
that "the charitable work must be the cause of the payment."120 The 
payments must not be ones that the taxpayer would have made regard-
less of the charitable activity.121 The charitable activity causes the ex-
pense when the expenditure primarily benefits the charitable 
organization rather than the taxpayer, hence the development of the pri-
mary benefit test.122 
In analyzing the taxpayer's payment as a direct contribution to the 
church, the Fifth Circuit, in Brinley II, found that even if the payments 
primarily benefited the individual missionary, a taxpayer would be enti-
tled to the deduction if he demonstrates a matching of the payments to 
116. See supra text accompanying notes 100-02. 
117. Babilonia v. Commissioner, 681 F.2d 678, 679 (9th Cir. 1982); Davis v. United 
States, 664 F. Supp. 468, 473 (D. Idaho 1987). 
118. See supra text accompanying notes 10-11. 
119. See supra text accompanying notes 103-08. 
120. Brinley v. Commissioner, 782 F.2d 1326, 1331 (5th Cir. 1986) (quoting Orr v. 
United States, 343 F.2d 553, 557 (5th Cir. 1965». 
121. Id. 
122. Id. 
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specific requests from the church. 123 This liberal control test is in con-
flict with the first requirement of the Supreme Court's test in American 
Bar Endowment, which allowed the payment to be deductible only to the 
extent of any excess beyond the benefits received by the taxpayer124 or, in 
this case, by the person performing the service. While matching the pay-
ments to specific requests by the church might indicate that the taxpayer 
intended that the payments benefit the church, such a matching does not 
necessarily prove any benefit to the church beyond the church's desire 
that such expenses be paid. An expense paid by a third party that is not 
deductible by the person performing the service would be a benefit to the 
performer and should not, at the option of the charitable organization, 
become deductible to a third party. 
The fourth prong of the modified American Bar Endowment test re-
quires that the person paying the expenses intend such payment to bene-
fit the charitable organization rather than the person performing the 
services. To determine the intent of a person contributing to a qualified 
organization, some courts have focused on the amount of control over 
the funds retained by the donor or exercised by the charitable organiza-
tion ("control test"). lis Although a donor may request that his contribu-
tion be applied to specific activities or funds of the organization,126 he 
may not limit the organization's use of the contribution to benefit a desig-
nated individual. 127 Such a limitation would indicate that the donor in-
tended the contribution to benefit the designated individual rather than 
the charity. 
The charitable intent of a person providing a service to a charity 
may be evidenced by the nature of the charitable activity. The charitable 
intent of a taxpayer serving as a full-time unsalaried missionary is appar-
ent by the mere performance of the missionary work. The charitable 
intent of a taxpayer providing transportation for the missionary, how-
ever, is less apparent. The taxpayer's intent may be to benefit the charity 
or it may be to benefit the individual missionary. Similarly, whether a 
taxpayer who contributes money to a full-time unsalaried missionary in-
tends his contribution to benefit the church or the individual missionary 
123. Id. at 1335. 
124. United States v. American Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105, 117 (1986). 
125. Brinley v. Commissioner, 82 T.e. 932, 939 (1984), vacated, 782 F.2d 1326 (5th Cir. 
1986). 
126. See, e.g., Winn v. Commissioner, 595 F.2d 1060 (5th Cir. 1979) (deduction permit-
ted where check was made payable to "Sara Barry Fund"); Peace v. Commissioner, 
43 T.C. 1, 2-3 (1964) (deduction allowed where checks made payable to "Sudan 
Interior Mission" with the names of specified missionaries written on the lower left-
hand corner of the face of the checks). 
127. See, e.g., Tripp v. Commissioner, 337 F.2d 432 (7th Cir. 1964) (contributions to 
college were disallowed because the donor intended to aid a friend in securing an 
education); Cook v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 771, 774 (1978) (charitable 
deduction not allowed for check made payable to the individual ministers because 
there was no evidence that the money was ever under the direct control of the reli-
gious organization). 
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is not apparent by the mere act of donating the money. When the do-
nor's intent is not made obvious by the mere act, he must produce fur-
ther evidence that he intends his contribution to benefit the charity. 
The amount of control the charitable organization exercises over the 
contributed funds and/or the activities of the person providing the chari-
table service is evidence of the intent of the contributor. Where the or-
ganization has absolute discretion as to the use of the funds or closely 
supervises and directs the activity of the person providing the service, it 
is likely that the donor or provider of services acted with charitable in-
tent. Where the funds are earmarked for a specific individual or the ac-
tivities of the volunteer lack any supervision or direction by the 
charitable organization, the intent of the donor or provider of services is 
less apparent. 
Anything less than absolute control may not be sufficient to prove 
donative intent and other factors which establish intent may need to be 
examined. For example, in American Bar Endowment, A.B.E. was obli-
gated to provide a requisite amount of insurance for the taxpayer from 
his initial payment. 128 Thus, A.B.E. had no discretion as to the initial 
use of the funds. The past performance of the insurance program indi-
cated the high likelihood of a dividend at the end of the period covered 
by the premium. 129 As a prerequisite to obtaining the insurance, the tax-
payers relinquished all rights to the dividend. 130 Further, once the divi-
dend was determined by the insurance company and paid to A.B.E., 
A.B.E. maintained complete control over and absolute discretion as to 
the use of the funds. Even so, the requisite charitable intent was not 
shown by the taxpayer and the deduction was not allowed. 131 Thus, con-
trol by the organization is not always determinative of the donor's intent. 
Although the greater the benefit to the charity the more obvious the 
charitable intent of the donor becomes and the greater the control the 
charity maintains over the funds the more apparent the benefit to the 
charity becomes, neither the "control test" nor the "primary beneficiary 
test" is sufficient alone to determine whether a payment constitutes a 
contribution or gift within the meaning of section 170. In Commissioner 
v. Duberstein, \32 the Supreme Court declined to adopt a test urged by the 
government to determine whether a transfer constituted a gift that was 
excludable from income under section 102. \33 Rather, the Court found 
that the proper criterion is one that inquires into the basic motivation 
behind the donor's conduct and explains his actions in making the trans-
128. See American Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. at 107-08. 
129. Id. at 108. 
130.Id. 
131. Id. at 118. 
132. 363 U.S. 278 (1960). 
133. Id. at 287-89. The test recommended by the government defined gifts "as transfers 
of property made for personal as distinguished from business reasons." Id. at 284 
n.6. 
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fer. 134 The Court stated, "The conclusion whether a transfer amounts to 
a 'gift' is one that must be reached on consideration of all the factors."13s 
Similarly, whether a payment constitutes a charitable contribution or gift 
under section 170 should be determined by considering all the factors. 136 
The taxpayer's knowledge that the service is being performed to 
benefit the charity, and his knowledge that expenses are incurred as a 
result of the service are critical factors to be shown. The organization's 
control over the funds and the amount of benefit received by the organi-
zation are also important factors. Further, the relationship between the 
donor and the organization, as well as the relationship between the donor 
and any third party that may benefit from the donation, are also relevant 
factors that should be considered by the court. Where the missionary is a 
stranger to the taxpayer, it is likely that the taxpayer intended the pay-
ment to benefit the church rather than the individual missionary. If the 
missionary is the taxpayer's son, however, the taxpayer's intent is not as 
clear. Where the taxpayer and his family have been lifetime members of 
a church and the taxpayer has encouraged his son to follow an estab-
lished practice of the church by serving as a missionary, the taxpayer's 
intent to benefit the church is supported by his relationship to the 
church. On the other hand, if the parent has no relationship to the son's 
church, it seems more likely that payments to the son would be intended 
to benefit the son rather than the church. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In determining whether a taxpayer may deduct the payment of ex-
penses resulting from services contributed by someone other than the 
taxpayer, the following four-pronged modified American Bar Endowment 
test should be satisfied: (1) the service performed benefits the charity; 
(2) the performance of the service is intended to benefit the charity; 
(3) the expense was incidental to the performance of the charitable ser-
vice; and (4) the payment of the expense was made with the intention of 
making a gift to the charity. In applying this test, the courts should con-
sider all of the relevant factors. These factors include whether the tax-
payer has knowledge that the service is being performed to benefit the 
charity, whethet: the taxpayer has knowledge of the expenses incurred as 
a result of the service, the amount of control the organization has over 
the activity of the person providing the serVice, the amount of control the 
organization has over the funds, the amount of benefit to the organiza-
tion, the amount of benefit to the taxpayer or to the person providing the 
service to the charity, the relationship between the taxpayer and the or-
134. Id. at 285-86. 
135. Id. at 288. 
136. For a discussion supporting application of the control test, see Shaller, Tax Exemp-
tion o/Charitable Organizations and the Deductibility o/Charitable Donations: Dan-
gerous New Tests, 8 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 77, 95-99 (1987). 
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ganization, and the relationship between the taxpayer and the person 
providing the service. 
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